MACM '92 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

IN SERVICE FAILURES FROM THE MARINE SURVEYORS POINT OF VIEW

Gregory T. Davis, NAMS-CMS

THE INSPECTION TECHNIQUE-COLLECTION OF DATA

The marine surveyor is often hired to perform a condition and value survey for the buyer prior to purchase of a used boat and is also hired by the insurance carrier to investigate the cause and extent of the damage due to the report of an insurance claim.

The investigative process remains the same, primarily comprised of visual inspection with non-destructive testing (NDT) via NOVANEX moisture meter and BARCOL hardness meters with air and laminate temperatures recorded electronically. The boat is also tested with the use of a 4 oz ball peen hammer with retorts observed. Upon completion, the process enables the experienced marine surveyor to be guided toward suspect areas. These areas can then be invasively tested via core samples, removal of parts for laboratory analysis and other destructive testing, ie: Chemical, Scanning Electron Microscope, that our consulting engineers may deem appropriate.

The first line inspection, collection of data process, is always completed by the surveyor and can be very subjective if guidelines are not maintained. The surveyor can be distracted by the concerns of: the buyer as to price, the boat broker as to closing the deal, the insurance company as to the dollar extent of the damage, the verbal rendition/s of the vessel owner and witnesses, his or hers own opinion/s and other factors. In order to deal effectively with these distractions an order of inspection process was devised. The process involves the measure of credibility given the data collected. Items of physical evidence are given the greatest measure with descending orders of magnitude given to verbal information from witnesses and disinterested parties with the least credibility given to statements from interested parties. The surveyor must be guided by the above evaluation process and before coming to a conclusion or opinion, be drawn to the position that the data supports.

Our surveyors are processed through an organized training program of classroom and field instruction and then continuing education seminars every quarter. Criteria developed by other organizations is utilized in data evaluation, such as: Standards and Recommended Practices for SmallCraft (1), NFPA 302 (2), Fiberglass Boat Design and Construction (3), Marine Survey Manual for Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Boats (4) and others.

Once a supported conclusion is determined the subject is evaluated for the extent of damage or a current market value, depending upon the survey request. In this area the same guidelines apply, in that no unsupported conclusion or opinion can be accepted. A dollar repair figure must be based upon known cost data either via original manufacturer or OEM, a market value must be supported by comparative listing/sale data from the same model or similar, and a repair cost agreed to by a service facility.

The outlined process ends with a written report rendered to the client. The data and the conclusion from this report is entered into our database reference files. This data can be accessed by manufacture, model, boat name, HIN, or any of thirty two indices and then sorted based upon the request. A thirty line synopsis of the conclusion of each survey is included in the reference.

Based upon the collection process guidelines and the method in which the data is stored and retrieved an accurate histogram of the survey experience can be garnered.

DATA PRESENTATION

The survey data was sorted based upon five categories (Table 1):

1. Operator Error

2. Manufacturer / Quality control Problems

3. Wear and Tear / Maintenance

4. Blister Problems

5. Uncategorized/Multiple Problems

 

1. Operator Error

The largest sample return is operator error, consisting of 868 inspections. These inspections are further broken down into collisions with submerged objects: 448, Collision with fixed surface or shore objects and or other boats: 230, maintenance as a subcategory of Operator Error:132, and grounding as a function of operator error:58 (Table 2).

The preponderance of submerged object collisions occurs within smaller boats, 16-24 feet, operated on smaller inland lakes and upon river systems. The operator is usually unaware of an impending collision, realizing there was damage only after the outdrive fails to continue operation.

Collision with other objects and or boats, the next highest percentage, usually occurred at night in good weather. Whether alcohol was involved or not was not directly tracked, due to a lack of testing on the part of authorities and or their non-involvement. The investigative results usually indicated the operator was in unfamiliar waters, claimed the other boat was operating without navigation lights, was distracted by activities on his/her boat or another, had been operating the boat in excess of 6 hours prior to the occurrence (tired), and physical evidence onboard indicating drinking had taken place. Grounding occurrences demonstrated similar characteristics.

The maintenance incidents follow two subcategories, a complete lack of or improper/inadequate procedures.

2. Manufacturer/Quality Control Problems

Examples from this category include the failure of secondary bonds at bulkheads, longitudinal oriented cracking along strakes and stringers with no impact related damage, and a lack of or insufficient backing for load bearing hardware (Table 3).

In one instance the lack of sufficient backing or a poor choice of fasteners by one manufacturer lead to the operators pedestal seat coming free from the cockpit sole during acceleration, injuring the operator and the passenger seated behind him.

 

Failures at the stringers have been found when the system is not connected to the transom and engine torque stress is not transmitted through the structure resulting in concentrated loadings inway of the engine bed stringers.

A water system failure at the shore feed lead to the sinking of a boat. We had two instances of the failure of "plastic" through hull fittings at the hull in way of the compression nut on the same model boat. In this instance an exemplar fitting was purchased from the manufacturer and the failed and exemplar fittings submitted to a plastics laboratory for testing. The test results indicated that the type of "plastic" utilized was wrong for the application, and the thread depth cut too deep.

Although the percentage is small, at times we have recorded more than one similar incidence per manufacturer and or model. We usually will contact the manufacturer to discuss our findings. Some manufacturers indicate they are aware of the problem we have found and either have corrected it on later models, or are willing to assist the boat owner in correction at this time. Other manufacturers are not as cooperative.

3. Wear and Tear

These 25 incidents are comprised solely of mechanical failures relating to inboard outboard engines and their drive systems (Table 4). Eleven of them were reported as submerged object collisions, thirteen as engine damage, and one overheating of the engine. Upon investigation the instances were found to be related to normal wear and tear rather than the reported cause/s.

4. Blister Problems

 

This is an innocuous category in that many smaller boats are found to exhibit blisters when a cursory inspection is made of stored boats in a marina, but the boat owners do not report the problem to the surveyor or choose to ignore it. The investigated blister problems therefore are a small percentage of the actual boats exhibiting the problem and usually represent larger boats where the dollar investment of the owner in the boat generates a greater concern toward protection of the investment (Table 5). The instance of survey requests relative to blister problems has declined in the last year, possibly due to corrective measures taken at the manufacturing level, and/or better knowledge of the problem and repair at the owner and marina level.

The survey inspection of a blister problem results in categorization of the "blister type" according to data found in "The Causes of Boat Hull Blisters"(5). The majority of instances exhibit type I blisters and the condition has demonstrated itself within 18 months of purchase and with mooring afloat, no bottom paint, in warmer water (72 F).

One investigation was undertaken as the result of a call from the marina. They had removed the gelcoat with sanders from below the waterline on this thirty foot sailboat in preparation for drying of the laminate and found corrosion pock marks along the hullside. The survey

 

inspection revealed the hydrolytic corrosion damage was isolated to one lamination panel comprising 33% of the starboard hullside. We requested permission from the owner of the vessel to complete destructive testing, but permission was denied. The boat was dried and then repairs completed. Because the single panel exhibited damage, we suspect a sizing reaction created higher WSM in this panel than the others, leading to the corrosion damage.

The worst instance of blistering was found on a boat originally purchased used in the Annapolis area and truck transported to the Great Lakes. The boat was surveyed prior to purchase and the survey report indicated blisters were found. The buyers therefore made arrangements for blister repairs to commence locally upon arrival. Their service provider had the boat in slings and was completing sand blasting of the bottom when we were asked to inspect.

The bottom, where blasted, had removed 1/8 inch of material. With each pass of the blaster, the blisters were opened and drained liquid (the temperature was 28 F) and severe corrosion damage to the laminate were found. This damage manifested itself as deep holes passing through three to five laminates with melted roving strands and blue cobalt outlines surrounding the holes. Four core samples were drilled from the balsa core hull (two delaminated in the bit) and submitted to Structural Composites Laboratory, Melbourne, Florida for analysis (Table 7). Structural Composites analysis of the test data indicated the moisture content of the outer skin was highly saturated and the inner skin excessive. The shear test data indicated that the bonding of the outer skin to the core was inadequate. Their recommendations were to replace the outer skin under parameters including vacuum bagging for drying the existing skin and then section removal replacement. The service provider began repairs as recommended and completed one hullside before filing for bankruptcy. The vessel was transported later to another service provider where the existing laminate was ground, epoxy coated, and the vessel placed back in service.

5. Uncategorized/Multiple Problems

This category actually arises from the circumstances of the original reported occurrence (Table 8). The investigation into the physical evidence and discussions with witnesses resulted in a determination of a chain of events or decisions/action having taken place in the course of the event. This chain results in several actions having a bearing upon the final outcome and as a result we categorize based upon the original report. We also include uncontrolled events, such as theft/vandalism and weather related occurrences into this broad category (Table 9).

 

The uncontrollable occurrences, such as thefts comprise twelve stolen boats and trailers, eleven boats alone, twenty-five outdrives or outboards, twenty-nine electronic devices, twenty-three stereos/TV's, nine boats stolen and recovered and the remainder are tenders, personal watercraft and other items.

Trailering incidents include six boats hit by cars during vehicular accidents, four human error accidents, three improper loading of the trailer, three tongue failure of the trailer, four slipping during launch and or haul out, four driving too fast for conditions and other subcategorized factors.

Direct fire aboard the vessel accounted for fifty-five incidents, three fires occurred due to a fire occurring on another boat or other source, two occurred due to a fire in the storage facility, and eight were determined to be electrical in origin. Upon completion of the investigations, two fires were of suspicious origin, two were arson (several others are pending court action/s) and one was accidental.

The accidental fire originated from the actions of the owners six year old son finding, loading, and discharging the flare pistol into the cabin of the boat. Luckily no one was injured in this unfortunate incident.

The sinkings occurred for a variety of reasons, of which ninety-one were due to boat systems failure/s, two from swamping, two due to improper maintenance, and six from vermin eating through the rubber boot of OMC stringer outdrive systems.

Weather, as a single category, accounts for the largest single percentage of investigations within category 5. As weather is a broad subject, we have subcategorized occurrence origins (Table 10).

The subcategories are, in large part, uncontrollable occurrences from the stand point of the boat manufacturer or boat owner. However, upon closer examination some actions on either part may have reduced the extent of the damage or possibly prevented the occurrence.

Wind/Storm, at first look, is purely uncontrollable. The formation of the storm, its strength and path certainly are. However the protection the harbor affords, the condition of the mooring, mooring lines, deck cleats and other hardware play an important role when the storms effects occur. In two of the subject data years a harbor in the Chicago area was hit by storms occurring within virtually the same two week period of October. The historical data indicated the same experience in the harbor from these storms with the same or similar damages to boats moored within accounting for several hundred thousand dollars in damages. The governmental operator of the harbor, upon discussion and review of the data, was responsive and implemented changes designed to protect the boats in the event of similar storm activities.

Along the river systems flooding becomes a factor. The US Army Corps of Engineers maintains historical data on the flood stages and marina construction is regulated. Therefore flooding is not necessarily uncontrollable or an act of God. The prudent operator does not build storage buildings within the known flood stage levels and if a flood has been known to occur in the past, causing damage, the operator has a duty to warn the boat owner of the possibility of flood damage prior to storing the boat.

Many boat owners leave their boats in slips or on mooring bouys for extended periods of time without shore power to provide charging of the batteries. When weather characteristics provide for long periods of rain, as in 1990 where only one weekend over the entire summer was rain free, boats sink as a result of an accumulation of rain water due to battery charge exhaustion.

In climates such as ours, winterization is required and in most cases the boat is stored on land during the winter. The weather patterns can change from 80 F days and 45 F nights to 28 F days and 14 F nights within a matter of days. In the fall of 1991 the weather changed, as outlined, within two days at the end of October to the beginning of November with a resultant forty instances of freezing damage to non-winterized engines.

Lightning occurrences are subcategorized into direct and indirect. Of the reported 24 instances, four were determined to be related to indirect causes, such as shore power side utility surges. Another three were power boats moored in the vicinity of sailboats and hooked to shorepower. Those powerboats in the vicinity and not hooked to shorepower when the strike occurred did not suffer damage. It is presumed that the practice of utility companies in grounding the neutral conductor provides a path for the high current induced into the battery chargers and electronic devices found severely damaged (Table 11).

Most sailboats suffered damage to the mast head antenna, VHF antenna coax cable, and electronics. Some boats manufactured of fiberglass reinforced plastic did not suffer damage to the hull or the through hull fittings. Those boats equipped with "plastic" through hull fittings usually experienced exploded fittings.

By far the majority of damages exhibited on the hull were comprised of gelcoat pops inway of the exploded plastic through hull fittings above the water line. The gelcoat pop pattern usually followed the turn of the hull in a line oriented fore and aft above the water line. This pattern repeated, for the most part, whether lighting protection was provided (ABYC (1)) or not.

The boats were hauled from the water from inspection of the bottom and often the boats would give the appearance of a multitude of crazing type cracks. However, upon removal of the bottom paint the gelcoat and laminate would show no visible signs of damage. It is presumed that the metallic base to the bottom paint provided for an imaging effect recording the dissipation pattern of the high frequency current.

The highest percentage reported by manufacturer is J Boats. The construction of the J Boat is somewhat unique in that the mast is through deck stepped and rests upon an aluminum I beam mechanically fastened between two transverse wooden bilge stringers under the mast partners. The J boats were found to have lightning ground systems in place (ABYC (1)). J Boats also has the highest percentage in dollar damage as a result of lightning. This may be partially due to popularity, thereby increasing its representation in the market sample (although Hunter and Catalina are highly popular boats in the market, with lower percentages)and/or it may be a function of the somewhat unique construction, as outlined earlier. The construction, as a function of the lightning protection system, has been evaluated by our consulting engineers and by J Boats with conflicting opinions expressed.

In all instances of lightning damage, the hull damage, when present, was repairable utilizing conventional methods. The electronics required replacement. Only in the J boat experience/s has there been a constructive total loss on the hull (a fire ensued from the direct lightning hit) and mast (the upper section of the mast lost temper (Rockwell test). A second J boat claimed as a constructive total loss has demonstrated numerous exterior gelcoat pops and burned laminate inway of the pops. This appears to be related to the balsa core and moisture content. It is our opinion the vessel can be repaired; the dealers opinion is that it cannot be successfully repaired.

CONCLUSIONS

The statistical evaluation of survey experience can be quantified when a consistent method of data collection and evaluation is enforced.

When the data collection method is standardized the actions of categorization on a uniform basis within a structured database program can provide for a historical record that can be sorted based upon the parameters of the request. This record can then be evaluated in comparison with other historical data and a picture of the experience developed.

There are always multiple factors involved, especially when people and their judgements are directly involved in the propagation of the occurrence. But the evaluation from an historical and statistical standpoint can be sound.

The current volume of raw data is too small to advance stringent conclusions as to any categories contained herein. However, as the sample base expands, the validity of the historical summary should provide a forum for quantitative study and founded conclusions.

REFERENCES

(1) American Boat and Yacht Council, Standards and Recommended Practices for Small Craft, 405 Headquarters Drive, Suite 3, Millersville, MD 21108.

(2) The National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 302, 1989 ed., Batterymarch Park, Quincy, Massachusetts, 02269.

(3) Scott, Robert J., Fiberglass Boat Design and Construction, John de Graf Inc., Tuckahoe, New York, 1973.

(4) Marine Survey Manual for Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Boats, Gibbs and Cox, Inc. Marine Engineers and Naval Architects, New York, New York, 1962.

(5) Rockett, T., and Rose, V., "The Causes of Boat Hull Blisters", Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, under USCG grant #1501.83.